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A Moeda como Fato Social Total na Crise
Argentina de 2001/02 e na sua Resolução
Jaime Marques Pereira(**)
Resumo: Este artigo contrapõe às explicações institucionais das reversões repentinas de antecipações,
tal como foi o caso da crise argentina de 2001/2002, uma análise revelando a crise do dispositivo
de confiança na moeda nacional, assim conceitualizada como fato social total. Com base nesta
visão multidimensional (econômica, política e simbólica) das funções da moeda, mostra-se que o
risco sistêmico do endividamento público na origem da crise resulta de promessas ilusórias de
ganhos futuros, assentadas na teoria nova clássica e pelas quais se armaram os compromissos
políticos que sustentaram o regime monetario de currency board. A resolução desta crise permitiu
redefinir um regime mais distributivo inspirado na teoria neo-keynesiana sem eliminar, no entanto,
o risco sistêmico. A conclusão aponta a validade mais geral desse resultado na atual crise mundial
ao destacar a responsabilidade da teoria neoquantitativa da moeda como representação da economia
conformando a ação coletiva.
Abstract: This paper opposes to the institutional explanations for sudden reversals of  expectations,
as was the case in the Argentinean crisis 2001/2002, an analysis revealing a crisis of  the trust set
in national currency, so conceived as total social fact.  Based on this multidimensional view
(economic, political and symbolic) of  the money functions, we show that the systemic risk of  the
public debt results from the illusions fostered by new classical theory on promises of  future
income founding the political compromises sustaining the currency board monetary regime. The
resolution of  this crisis has given room to a more distributive regime inspired in new-keynesian
theory but not to the elimination of  this systemic risk.  The conclusion points out in the present
context of  world crisis the more general validity of  this issue focusing the responsibility of  neo-
quantitative theory of  money as a representation of  economy performing collective action.
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INTRODUCTION
Starting from the vision of  money as total social fact, this work studies the 2001/2002
Argentine monetary crisis as a coordination crisis. It re-examines in this way the question
of  market adjustments at the level of  the money functions’ integration.
The setting of a definition of money as a total social fact poses the unit of account
as a variable and not as a data. The account function may in this way be studied as an
organizer of  the price system: it specifies how prices depend on the confidence into money,
operating in credit and titles’ evaluation. The information delivered by prices is therefore
a coordination of  knowledge about the economy (the plans of  agents). The object of  the
anticipation cannot from then be reduced to a simple calculus of  futures’ utilities. It’s
about interpretations — the economy is a hermeneutic. Reversals of  anticipations operating
in a financial crisis must be, in this sense, defined as reevaluations revealing erroneous
interpretations.
This analytical grid of  a particular systemic crisis shows what it has in common
with other cases: an ignorance of  the systemic risk at the basis of  distributive compromises
constitutive of  a monetary regime. These compromises are about promises of  revenues
that economic theory justifies. In this cognitive performance, the neo-quantitative theory of
money is the lever of  a major institutional change as to the governing of  anticipations.
The monetarist norm was in Argentina a social faith. In the 2001/2002 crisis, it
suddenly became a central object of  the public debate. This reveals the practical senses of
the norm, what each one attributes to the norm and that, in this manner, guides its actions.
Capital flees, which triggers the collapse of  the payment system, appears to be immoral.
Beyond political responsibilities, the crisis highlights the responsibility of  a belief  — the
necessary neutrality of  money. In practice, leaving to markets the power of  monetary
issuance has excluded from the field of  vision of  decision-makers the monetary dangers
of  over-indebtedness. The economic theory is, in the very same way, indirectly responsible
for the crisis.
The acting of  a theory is here its performance to establish the governing upon the
maintained ignorance of  systemic risk. Beyond diverse forms of  over-indebtedness, this
ignorance may be described as a general cognitive norm of  a political logic organizing
wage deflation or, at best, its contention. Before developing this analysis, we specify the
methodological implication of  the conceptualization of  money at the basis of  this inter-
pretation of  the crisis and its outcome.
***
Considered as a total social fact, money is a fundamental mechanism of society
reproduction which determines its economic functions. Money in this way is defined as
unit of  account which symbolizes the value that objectifies in means of  payments a regime of
debts monnayage
(1)
. The interaction between these three functional forms of  money implies
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(1) The term “monnayage” still exist in French. In its common sense, it is equivalent with the offering price. By instance,
for qualify the price one expects for any kind of  effort. What it denotes of  money creation still exists but does not
appear anymore. The making of  modern money is pure abstraction, since it has no more metal anchorage. One does not mint
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a contingent interdependence between account and payment community and political
community.
This definition comes within the tradition that focuses the analysis of  money as a
debt counterpart and more precisely the fact stressed by Schumpeter (1970) on its property
to express credit by a fixed nominal value. Money makes the operation of  a bank balance-
sheet a social accountability of  each individual contribution to the creation of  wealth and
of  the part of  it he can claim. O. Lakomski-Laguerre (2004) points out the limits to this
analysis: the essence of  money as institution of  this accountability implies the consideration
of  the existence of  an authority defining «legal money» and its convertibility into central
money. In this sense, it is in money itself  that lies the power of  coordination that Schumpeter
attributes to bank evaluation of  enterprises’ bets enabling a revival of  debts and, thus, the
innovating dynamic of  capitalism.
The definition of  money as a total social fact highlights the nature of  this monetary
power as sovereign power. It allows specify market’s coordination through the unit of
account and the creation of  means of  payments. So, it breaks with an instrumental vision
of  money functions that ignores the legitimacy of  a monetary regime on which depends
its permanence. It shows that this legitimacy stems from the fact that the possibility of
exchanges supposes a social agreement on the convertibility of  units of  account, peculiar
to the diverse networks of  debts. We take in consideration that it exists, despite appearances,
a plurality of  units of  account beyond currencies. This plurality is not only a plurality of
issuers — for example, provincial moneys that were issued in Argentina to overcome the
means of  payment shortage after 1998. The plurality can be otherwise detected in the fixation
of  relative prices when it mobilizes various units of  account. We show that desired profits
are calculated in Argentina with reference to the currency. The exchange risk covering —
whether by inflation or by indexation — is included in sales prices, and thus determinate
capital revenues.
It is then the uniqueness of  a system of  account that transforms money into a social
accountability. It implies consequently, as much as the issuance of  means of  payments, a
regulation power on which depends the legitimacy of  the incomes’ distribution. The
confidence in their permanence commits the monnayage of  debts. The latter is the cog
where forms the coordination of  decentralized decisions. In this way, the confidence translates
into a pacification of  the conflicts of  interests inherent to promises concealed by a monetary
regime.
The conciliation of  interests mobilizes a cognitive function of  economic theory.
The nexus that it establishes between monetary policy and structural reforms marks off
collective action to a representation of  the economy where employment and salaries depend
on the political compatibility between structural reforms and price stability
(2)
. This nexus
is inspired by the contemporary revision of  money neutrality’s postulate. In this paper,
we seek understand on the Argentine case how this representation of  the future imposes
money but one still gets money in exchange of  a debt recognition. A monetary regime regulates credit and its counterpart
— the money issuance. In this sense, it seam more precise to use the expression “monnayage regime of  debs”, expressing
clearly the fact it is related to sovereignty as signified by the ancient term monnayage.
(2) See for example the discussion on European governance (cf. Aghion and al. 2004).
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itself  de facto as a coordination model in collective action where forms distributive com-
promises, constitutive of  a regime of  debts monnayage. We will analyze successively the
model that establishes coordination on the reputation of  rigor with the currency board
issuance regime (1991-2001) and afterward the current model which coordination is based
on an exchange rate said to be «competitive and foreseeable» (since 2002).
The first part of  the paper identifies the mark of  the postulate of  money neutrality
in these two types of  regimes. The second deciphers its performance as a cognitive referent
of  illusionary incomes promises in the long term. From a comparative viewpoint, the
Argentine case suggests that the committing of  speculation excesses on trial in the current
bank intermediation world paralysis level points out likewise the crisis of  an accounting
system by which over-indebtedness is the counterpart of  salary regression. Only the
Ponzi agent varies: households, enterprises and/or financial institutions, state.
1. FROM INDETERMINATION OF THE MICRO/MACRO NEXUS TO INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES
The problem of  coordination has encouraged a substantial reformulation of  the
analysis of  the relation between micro and macro-economics. Neo-classical models release
some of  their axioms to integrate socio-technical parameters more in accordance with
the reality of  contemporary economies, such as information asymmetry or increasing
returns. It has then been possible to provide a more realistic representation of  the economy
but the question of  micro/macro relation has not been elucidated. In the absence of  a
positive theory of  collective action that includes time and money
(3)
, the micro/macro
relation in the long term is undetermined. Reducing collective action to actuarial calculus
of  a representative agent for whom money is just some number only eliminates the problem.
The economist then can only resort to ad hoc hypothesis to report from the real
world by partial non-unified theories and the neo-classical approach would not be more
than a methodological individualism, deprived of  axiomatic (Amable, Boyer and Lordon, 1995).
These ad hoc hypotheses are nevertheless justified as a description of  macroeconomic
correlations which allow decision-makers to forecast their choices’ effects. The question
is then that of  the persistence of  prescriptive deductions from the dynamic general equi-
librium model. The institutional conditions of  partial equilibriums only have, indeed, a
normative value in so far as the dynamic general equilibrium can hold as «true» model of
the economy and the micro-institutional prescriptions (postulated) thus offer the neo-
classical methodology a new axiomatic strength. Such a methodology is questionable but
does not prevent it from being the foundation of  authorized knowledge
(4)
. Institutions
that the «true» model leads to prescribe are considered as a development model. Within this
(3) To quote only decisive statements, one can recall that the question of  time is posed by Arrow (1995) when he stresses
the need to highlight the shaping of  rules in strategic games between central bank and the public. One must also recall
that, from the 1950s, Samuelson (1956) reported the need of  a social contract on money to think the long term.
(4) The qualification of  authorized refers to the hegemony of  neoclassical methodology in the corporative field of  economists
and to the cognitive referent character that acquired the theories that follow for private agents (or interests groups) and
political actors. Our analysis favors the neoclassical debate, given its importance as cognitive referent of  collective
action, which implies the consideration of  economic policy as a social communication (Théret, 1999).
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framework, only debates on the relevance of  a macroeconomic smoothing of  the cycle
can subsist, opposing new Keynesians and the new classical economists. More recently,
the empirical knowledge of  the optimal sequence of  institutional building defines a second
rank optimum according to the political economy peculiar to each country (Rodrik, 2008).
1.1. THE NEO-CLASSICAL DEBATE OF THE 2001/2002 CRISIS: MARKET OR GOVERNMENT
FAILURES?
The micro/macro nexus explains simultaneously the success and the crisis of  the
Argentine economic model of  the 1990s. This is an extreme version of  the model of
coordination by the reputation of  rigor. The rigor of  the currency board regime
(5)
 combines
with a Big Bang of  liberalizations. The systemic risk that was generated by external
indebtedness on which is going to depend monetary creation was only perceived ten years
later when the sudden end to external financing caused a run on banks. The 2001/2002
crisis has raised a debate the international resonance of  which pointed out that its inter-
pretation could lead to recognize the limits of  main stream theory (Sgard, 2004): the
tragic end to the experience was indeed proven to be hardly attributable to the failure to
complete the most fundamental structural reforms and therefore raised the question of  a
coordination failure by market forces.
An absence of  monetary austerity could not be questioned but the lack of  budgetary
adjustment to the lowering of  incomes could explain why the flight of  capital had not
been reversed as in 1995 with the contagious effect of  the Mexican crisis. Prominent
economists who had been compromised in the Convertibility plan’s defense had to attribute,
in this logic, the Argentine crisis to budgetary laxness. The IMF research director on
Latin America, M. Mussa (2002), and the World Bank vice-president, A. Krueger (2002),
set the tone for those analysis exempting the coordination by market forces from any
fundamental responsibility
(6)
: the thesis of  the indebtedness intoxication of  the Argentine
government, that the debate retained from M. Mussa contribution, echoes Krueger’s proposi-
tion that an international court be established that would arbitrate the bankruptcies of  states.
The budgetary laxness hypothesis was demolished through the analysis of  the effects
on the real exchange rate, peculiar to a currency board regime. The worsening of  the
budget deficit was only the result of  real exchange revaluation, linked to the growth of
public debt. The Haussman and Velasco model (2002) reports this interaction and clearly
explains this dead-end of  the Argentine economy: «to grow, it had to risk accumulating
a debt up to the insolvency point ; to ensure external balance, the economy had to bear a
strong fall that also lead to insolvency (quoted by Boyer, 2004: 691). The dead-end expresses
an “original sin” paid by the impossibility of  international funding, written/drawn in
local currency (Eichengreen and Haussmann, 2003).
(5) The monetary basis is limited to its currencies’ counterpart. The norm is inscribed in the convertibility law.
(6) In the same perspective, the insufficiency of  labor market reforms that would have limited the adjustment was also
considered (Krueger, 2002; Feldstein, 2002, quoted by Sgard, op. cit.) The argument was swept by the IMF study (2004)
calculating the fall of  labor unit costs at 20% from 1994 to 1998.
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Another explanation focused on an inconsistency of  long term anticipations (Heymann,
2002) — agents were wrong about growth potential depending on competitive gains.
The coordination failure by market forces, that sudden reversal of  anticipations, indicates,
could nevertheless be attributed to contracts insecurity over time, which would have had
to be reduced through legal reforms, fiscal responsibility, and deposits insurance (Galliani,
Heymann and Tomasini, 2003). What matters in this approach is the inconsistency of
anticipations. J. Sgard demonstrates this, reminding us that the lowering of  saving rates
as compared to its historical average points out that the agents do not have a so-called
Ricardian behavior that should, in theory, be verified, that thus anticipatively invalidated
any possibility of  observing a lowering of  public spending balanced by an increase in
private spending. He also invokes investment weakness during the period compared to its
historical trend, established on the basis of  cautious hypotheses taken from a neoclassical
model of  growth (Kydland and Zaragaza, 2002).
The opposition of  interpretations is nonetheless dissolved because, as Sgard stresses
it, they all can reconcile on the diagnosis of  B. Eichengreen (2002, quoted by Sgard, op. cit.)
that the currency board regime failure in Argentina is in fine not to have managed to give
place to a «reforms forum». The responsibility would then be primarily political.
1.2. ECONOMIC POLICY AND ANTICIPATIONS IN THE CRISIS EXIT
The coordination question has not been at the heart of  the debate on the end of  the crisis.
It, nevertheless, is demonstrated to be central in the success of  measures that rapidly
checked depression and later pushed growth well beyond what allowed the providential
turnaround in the international economic situation. The analysis from D. Heymann (2006)
quoted above is an exception. It strives to identify very precisely the behaviors that monthly
and quarterly
(7)
 series suggest, to explain how economic policy was able to reduce private and
public indebtedness, raised by the convertibility law repeal, in tuning the control of  the liquidity
of  the economy, of  global spending and of  public incomes. The author defends the thesis
that this success would have resulted from the acceptance of  the peso as denominator of
current exchanges thanks to a monetary policy, qualified as “flexible but cautious”.
The fact is empirically identifiable in the control of  the peso depreciation after the
abandonment of  parity. The acceptation of  a devaluated peso as the unit of  account of
exchanges nevertheless mobilizes institutional changes that get away from neoclassical
prescriptions. The so called “asymmetrical pesification” and the unilateral proclamation
of  default constitute a violation of  contracts which, at that time, has lead most main
stream economists to forecast a worsening of  the crisis
(8)
.
The first measure allowed the conversion of  a large part of  deposits at the rate of
1 for 1.4 and of  bank credits at the rate of  1 for 1. The effect of  this disparity on banks’
balance sheets has been covered by public titles. The time deposits have been indexed on
(7) These series are easily consultable, this report being accessible on the ECLAC-Buenos Aires website.
(8) Admittedly, the default may have been advocated by some renowned economists (cf. Sgard, op. cit.). Under inventory
reserve, the theoretical question that he raises in terms of  discretion norm has nevertheless not been discussed.
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the CPI (consumer price index) and, subsequently, offered the possibility to convert them
into public titles. The exchange market liberalization will imply a depreciation that will
exceed the rate of  4 pesos for 1 dollar. The national currency later revalues to stabilize
quickly around 3 for 1. The discretionary redefinition of  monetary assets and liabilities’
nominal value has avoided the collapse of  the banking system while the unilateral
suspension of  public debt service has prevented the depreciation from provoking the
state’s bankruptcy
(9)
. It was then possible to trigger a virtuous macro-economy only a few
months after the enactment of  these measures at the beginning of  2002.
The depression of  GDP, – 10.2% on the whole year of  2002, has gradually bended.
The decline in private consumption slowed from the second quarter and industrial production
recovery began during the third quarter. D. Heymann explains this inflection by the comple-
mentarities between monetary policy and the abrupt external adjustment.
The threat of  an explosive drift of  inflation would have been controlled by the
convergence of  conducts of  the private agents and the authorities. The former “dissociate
their refusal of  keeping funds in the financial system and their money demand decisions;
more precisely, they have not dollarized their liquid assets for transactions, nor the prices’
denominator of  current exchanges”. As to the authorities, their fear of  a high inflation
strongly incited them to “adopt a monetary and macroeconomic management that induces
prospects of  sufficient stability to allow, among other objectives, the making of  contracts
on not too short terms” (Heymann, 2006, p. 53)
Depreciation entails a collapse of  imports which quickly generates a significant
trade surplus. The recovery in tax collect that follows is supported by the increase in
nominal receipts, while salaries and civil servants’ pensions are not indexed. It is, furthermore,
fed by tax on exports in which growth is favored simultaneously by devaluation and the
increase in demand implying that of  prices. The budget deficit thus quickly becomes a surplus.
These new macroeconomic equilibriums are consolidated by monetary and exchange policy.
Currencies purchase against central bank titles slows the exchange rate appreciation that
would have reduced price-competitiveness. The accumulation of  partially sterilized reserves
of  exchange and the debt restructuring in 2005
(10)
 reinforced the anticipation of  a strong
growth continuation based on a competitive and foreseeable exchange rate. Since 2003,
the rate of  growth has stayed at around 7%. During the period, the investment rate grew
more rapidly than the private saving rate but the national saving rate, fed by budget
surplus, covered the difference.
Heymann does not see in the increase of  saving and investment rates a sign of  long
term growth anticipation because the economy would henceforth find itself  confronted
with the inertia of  an inter-temporal choice favoring consumption over future gains. Given
(9) Otherwise, while States’ liabilities represented 4.1% of  GDP on the eve of  devaluation, they would have increased in 3
years of  9 to 11 points, according to a simulation established according to the stabilized exchange rate (Damill, Frenkel
and Rapetti, 2007)
(10) The conversion of  public debt into default, that creditors have accepted, cuts its dollar value of  56.2%. The service of
this debt is reduced from 10,175 millions US$ on 31.12.2001 to 3,205 on 18.3.2005, date of  the issuance of  the new
titles. This reduction of  public debt cost has however for counterpart the capitalization of  interests payable from the
11th year (Lo Vuolo and Seppi, 2008). For the official numbers, see AGN, 2006. See also, for an analysis in historical
perspective, Damill and al., op. cit.
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the Argentine productive structure, the author considers that arise a problem of  incentives
to invest in production exposed to foreign competition, especially the one of  agricultural
goods as they are at the same time wage goods.
2. ANTICIPATIONS, MONEY AND THE SYSTEMIC RISK CYCLE
The common denominator of  current exchanges does not have the neutrality ascribed
by an explanation of  the way out of  the crisis related to the cautious flexibility of  a
monetary policy. In this explanation, the former denominator is kept because of  its capacity
to be, according to the general equilibrium model, a means of  payment that is considered
as the ultimate (n+1) good, serving as standard. We will consider that this denominator is
also act to denominate and that the efficiency of  monetary policy is, for this reason, linked
to the sense that the monetary sign conveys in a price setting.
The language of  the economy — communication by prices — has to be viewed as a
social production of  sense that matches a signifier with a referent, as shown by a sociological
approach to money
(11)
. The sign is thus not neutral, neither in the posting of  prices, or in
the formation of  macroeconomic equilibriums. Behind gains probability, the incentives’
challenge implies distributive compromises on the capacities of  spending, of  private and
public debts liabilities and servicing, which model the monetary regime.
The analysis that we now develop of  the monetary regime considers it as the result
of  an agreement on the monnayage of  debts. The rule articulates the generic properties of
money that are account and payment. The compromise on the rule (and its opposition)
makes of  these properties some functional forms of  their use. This one is at the same
time economical, political and symbolical, which signals the existence of  money under
three different states. The incorporated state of  the value sign exists at the same time as
the objectified state by a payment instrument gaining thus commodity status. The former
and the latter states are the two faces of  money (so-called pure number and issuer’s




Rather than keeping with an instrumental vision of  money functions, one thus has
to consider existing states of  money that are linked by the fact of  taking simultaneously
functional forms peculiar to the symbolical system — the account, to the political system
— the monnayage, and to the economical system — the payment. In this interaction,
society constitutes and reproduces itself, which means that money is a total social fact, in the
sense suggested by Mauss. This analysis characterizes the determinants — contingents to
each particular society in a given historical period — of  the forms of  collective confidence
in money, qualified as methodical, hierarchical and ethical.
(11) Following B. Théret, its essential contribution to economic analysis is to show that money is a system of  generalized
communication by the fact it is a “special language” that permits to undertake in confidence economic and social
transactions.
(12) This conceptual device is not a set of  postulates but a theoretical result of  a multidisciplinary analysis that establishes
the permanence of  these generic properties of  money beyond its functional forms, varying along the history of
civilization (Théret, 2007).
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The matrix formalization that B. Théret (2008) proposes with regard to the interaction
of  money functional forms specifies in this context their autonomy and interdependence
defining its structure as total social fact. Autonomy means that each state of  money has a
peculiar functional form and interdependence that this peculiar state is, as such, equally
active in the other functional forms; which is featured by the matrix of  these interactions
in the currency board regime and in the current regime (see table 1 and 2 forward).
The usefulness of  specifying forms of  confidence is to circumscribe the observation
field of  an analysis applied to money as «abstract expression of  the collectivity (...) that
conditions the mental structures of  individuals by mediating their actions» (Aglietta and
Orléan, 2002: 102-103). In analysis of  concrete situations, it allows the linking of  research
results of  diverse disciplines to characterize the mediation in question instead of  postulating it.
2.1. FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE RUIN OF CONFIDENCE
The convertibility law grants legal tender to the dollar and the peso at the same time.
The point was to see if, through putting it in competition with the dollar, the national
currency would again become able to ensure the unit of  account and the value reserve
functions. The model of  coordination through rigor has served of  theoretical justification
of  such a bet and optimistic anticipations that resulted from it were considered as a proof  of
its relevance. Under disinflation and growth, postulates at the basis of  the model could be
hold as a correct approximation of  reality.
Yet it is the distance from reality, as much of  the model as of  its discourse, that
made the bet playable. Numerous analyses indeed suggest that public decision-makers
seemed perfectly conscious that optimism depended on this distance. Hypotheses of  money
neutrality, of  competition efficiency, and of  uniform rational anticipations are the con-
vertibility Plan’s cognitive referent. Its justification guides collective action but this one
is not—far from it—in line with what the model prescribes. Hypotheses of  the model
structure the language of  the communication policy, making it received as true.
2.1.1. THE MODEL AND ITS LANGUAGE/DISCOURSE
To win the bet of  the adhesion of  all to a new national unit of  account, what primarily
mattered was the model language. It refers to the credibility of  the monetary regime to
ethical and social values of  liberalism. More precisely, we can say that it formulates the
belief  in a restructuring of  the nation that makes it a market society, able to make good
use of  globalization thanks to money which quality makes it equal to the dollar.
The government agenda of  the institutional transformation of  the economy provided
all the advertising required to this political will. Naming of  «convertibility Plan» echoes
the law designation instituting a bi-monetary regime. The discourse identifying the good
quality of  money to its ability to resist the dollar competition changed the fixed parity into
a relative prices language that refers them implicitly to the vision of  justice, associated to
the values of  market freedom imposing them with globalization.
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An interview with an advisor of  Domingo Cavallo, made the day before his nomination
as Minister of  Finances, suggests how the convertibility Plan and its communication
policy were conceived (Roig, 2008). It specifies the subliminal message of  the new system
of  account. This analysis of  the interview reveals this strategic aspect of  beliefs in the
symbolical load conveyed by the political slogan “making a clean sweep of  the past through
money that is born ‘healthy’, because it was submitted to the dollar competition”. The
discourse concentrates what one has to call, from a sociological viewpoint, the expected
symbolical performance of  money as a special language, that is, its capacity to guide
collective action through the representation provided by economic policy.
The past, which is mentioned, is the referent of  prices denominator. To make possible
the stopping of  a price drift, which became uncontrollable, the monetary rule must liquidate
the cause that the theory had identified — the populist macro-economy (Dornbusch and
Edwards, 1992). In this sense, making a clean sweep of  the long past of  compromise with
inflation demands to get rid of  the former conception of  national development — indus-
trialization by imports substitution.
To come to the clearance of  this inheritance, the quality that the peso has to acquire
does not reduce itself  as a special «competitive» good, which recovers here the sense
of  nominal anchor, ensured in theory by its distributive neutrality. In reality, the quality of
the nominal anchor has not been the one of  distributive neutrality. Quite the contrary,
forced parity has been the means to make possible a distributive compromise. The quality
of  the rule was to act on representations of  social justice and economic interests (in the
double sense of  the term representation, as idea and as organization). It is through these
representations constructed in collective action that develop the legitimacy of  the monetary
regime and structural reforms. The economic bet on disinflation was first a bet on symbolical
and political order constitutive of  a monetary regime.
2.1.2. PROFIT PROMISES AND THE FIGURE OF THE PEOPLE
The political and symbolical bet that the convertibility Plan committed has been
won in collective action, on the one hand, through promises of  profit, related to structural
reforms and, on the other hand, thanks to the ideological change that legitimates the former.
Privatization is the launching pad of  structural reforms. It is the cornerstone of  a
«business community» reconstruction (Basualdo, 2006). The sale of  public enterprises
resolves state bankruptcy, caused by hyperinflation. It allows simultaneously obtaining
the adhesion from public debt creditors. The means was to accept that part of  the payment
of  privatized assets was drawn on Treasury bonds at face value, while their market value
had been reduced
(13)
. Privatizations provide the means of  restoring external indebtedness.
Along with capital repatriation, this allows their realization on a larger scale.
A second generation of  reforms brings about a reduction of  taxes on employers and
provides new rules of  competition. The former permits the anticipations of  new monopoly
(13) This form of  solving the Latin American debt crisis was advocated by international institutions since the mid 1980s.
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rents
(14)
, in addition to the ones that prejudged concession contracts of  collective services.
The effects of  trade liberalization on employment and salaries, associated with the recasting
of  labor laws, serve as the device intended to put the profit curve back on an upward
trajectory.
Figure 1: Wage average, labour productivity, tot.
capital productivity, profit ratio. Index 1960 = 100
Source: CIEPP (2009), data CEPED (2007), Maia y Nicholson (2002), Llach y Sánchez (1984), CEPAL
(1991) and INDEC.
Thus a business community re-joins together from the two components of  capital
that the work of  E. Basualdo (cited above) identifies on the basis of  an analysis of  patrimonial
restructuring since the 1970s: on the one hand, what he calls the diversified oligarchy —
big groups oriented toward export and financial activities and that have integrated part of
the former national industrial bourgeoisie ; on the other hand, foreign capital — international
banks, creditors of  the public debt, and transnational corporations. The share of  the former
in national income had clearly fallen during the 1980s but is going to rise in a significant
manner during the 1990s. The coalition of  interests between these two dominant components
of  capital takes shape through the revaluation of  financial and physical assets. The work in
question shows the productive valuation of  each of  these two dominant components of
capital in the big firms’ trading accounts. We postpone until the next section a review of  the
financial dimensions of  this valuation because it locates external indebtedness in anticipations’
reversal.
(14) There are numerous studies on the question. For an analysis of  their importance in the formation of  government’s
political coalition, see Palermo, 2004.
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From 1993 to 2000, the 500 largest firms saw their gross operating surplus increased
7.1% per year. The one of  the 200 largest firms increased 8.4% during the period. GDP
growth average was 4.9%. These gaps are related to export activity. Thus, unlike the rest
of  the economy, during the whole period, the turnover of  the largest firms was less
affected by the cycle down-turns’ years of  the period (1995, 1998-2000).
On the other hand, the total salary-bill grew by only 1.7% per year. Average real
salary increased by 2.2% per year from 1991 to 1994. It subsequently collapsed while
productivity continued to grow until 1998 at around 8%. Productivity gains were made
because of  the importing of  new equipment (the cost of  which was decreased by the
lowering of  tariffs and appreciation of  real exchange rate), of  the new liberal labor law,
and of  the reorganization of  production; the whole translated into an increase in the level of
unemployment, the fragility of  employment, and the intensification of  work (Neffa, 2004).
Despite unfavorable consequences for employees in the functional distribution of
income, the increase in unemployment and under-employment (these variables stabilized
during second period of  growth), the coalition integrated the political actors representing labor.
The ability of  certain unions to manage pension trust funds constituted a revealing
element, although their place in the market was marginal. What matters are the consequences
of  the evolution of  the political regime that moved from Peronism to neo-liberalism
(15)
.
Argentina is considered as an emblematic case of  “democracy by delegation”, a concept
that characterizes the “presidentialism” established in Latin-American democratizations
(Svampa, 2007). In this type of  political regime, the sovereignty of  the people is limited
to clienteles and corporatist mechanisms by which the individual’s power is for the most
part delegated to the presidential function. Without going into details of  the reorganization
of  the Argentine political system, it is advisable to specify the transformation of  Peronism as
a core variable of  the place of  a new social justice conception in the distributive compromise
that constitutes the monetary regime.
This mutation is particularly well highlighted by an analysis of  the Peronist movement
militants’ political discourses and practices, proposed by A. Tizziani (2007). His work
demonstrates how the Peronist ideology integrates protest of  the economic and social
policy led by the party which incarnates it. According to it, the Peronist neo-liberal meta-
morphosis did not damage its ability to remain identified with the people. The analysis of
the discourse of  Peronist militants shows their resignation to a form of  legitimacy, based
on a proclaimed subordination to the destiny imposed by the law of  the market, which
drives them to limit their militant actions to assistance to the poor by local powers. We
can add that the acceptance of  market law incorporates the conception of  social justice as
defended by contemporary economic theory (to increase the “capabilities” of  the poor for
economic and political integration). The both hypothesis are justified by a redefinition of
collective action that legitimates market through the empowerment of  the poor, as suggested
(15) The term Peronism denotes in sociological literature the social and political movement, agent of  the general Peron
mythical inheritance, minister of  labor and later president of  Argentina, who institutes universality of  social rights
in the 1940s. The reference to Peronism recovers however in the common sense a wider meaning that makes it the
very image of  people, which explains the ability of  the Peronist party to incorporate the social opposition to the
convertibility Plan (Tizziani, 2007) and to integrate today (see below) a significant part of  social movements’ leaders
that represents the sectors of  population not having taken advantage of  current growth (Svampa, 2007).
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by A. Tizziani analysis. The Peronist government proves itself  able to recast politics,
domesticating the «big popular animal», recalling Rancière Platon’s famous expression.
We can, in a complementary manner, put forward the hypothesis that the original
Peronist utopia of  social cohesion, based on a pact between classes, is replaced by that of
a neo-liberal society because the former exorcises the traumatic memory of  radical social
conflict. The slogan «making a clean sweep of  the past» amounts to the repression of  the
memory of  the guerilla war and its bloody repression during the second half  of  the 1970s.
The slogan induces belief  in the definitive replacement of  class struggle, that leaved in
the past no other governing alternative than the macro-economy of  populism.
This hypothesis is developed in similar terms by L. Blaum (2007) in his analysis of
economic knowledge as new form of  the discourse of  the Master, legitimating the system
of  domination. Applying to Argentina the characterization applied by J. Lacan to socialism,
Blaum shows in a Marxist perspective that the economist’s discourse allows the Argentine
to think himself  primarily as economic agent because this discourse transforms money
into a symbolic process by which the commodity fetish enables him to repress past trauma.
The discourse of  “vulgar political economy” thus signifies, at a psychic level, that the
symbolical field it marks out makes the individual discover the social purpose of  the self-
regulation of  markets.
Considering the reconstruction of  confidence in money, this analysis specifies the
psychic goal related to «healthy» money discourse, that the Master loans from the economic
theory of  neo-liberalism. The system of  account, as a symbolical system of  signs, recasts
the social faith in nation on the principles of  individualistic values. The convertibility
Plan has carried out a redefinition of  the political system of  subjects, which drives them
to redevelop their economic actions (investment bets, labor market or informal activities
insertion strategies) in the frame of  a new sovereignty regime which recasts the nation
on the value of  the individual as economic agent.
2.1.3. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE IGNORANCE OF SYSTEMIC RISK
The crisis begins when is called into question the belief  that foreseeable competitive gains
are the pledge of  payment promises and of  the revival of  external debts
(16)
. The coherence
between the new states of  existence of  money is going to break. It was nevertheless not
a sudden reversal of  anticipations, nor the general inconsistency of  the former. What
really matters was that the confidence in nominal anchor’s stability on the long term was
not as generalized as the success of  the convertibility Plan induced one to believe.
E. Basualdo analysis of  patrimonial restructuring cruised with external accounts
permits to show that ethical confidence was in fact limited since the beginning. Indeed, it
did not proceed from an instituted state of  money ensuring the unity of  the system of
account over the long term. There is differentiation in long term anticipation between
(16) This is happening following Brazil’s renunciation of  exchange anchorage in 1998. The neighbor country is representing
then a third of  the exports.
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components of  capital. The diversified oligarchy seems to have believed only in short-
term promises. It will go to rid itself  of  assets that commit incomes in pesos. It gradually
sells back the titles of  privatized enterprises and of  those which are oriented toward
domestic demand.
The monetary fact unity rests on a long term illusion but that this component of
capital did not share but from which it thrived. Its distrust of  fixed parity in long term
has to be viewed, however, as a parameter in confidence building in the short and medium
term and, as such, a condition of  the distributive compromise constitutive of  the monetary
regime. This paradox brightens up in the analysis of  debts composition. The expansion
of  foreign exchange reserves was ensured until 1995 by private external indebtedness and
thereafter by public external indebtedness. The fixed parity credibility, conditioning payment
promises, depended on the level of  reserve. So, the key to success of  the convertibility
Plan to restore confidence was equally the one of  its destruction.
The patrimonial restructuring is determining in the evolution of  external accounts.
Basualdo puts forward two observations: 1/ from 1994 to 1997, the progression in the
resale of  assets from which income is drawn in pesos is concomitant to capital outflows
and private external indebtedness; 2/ the groups owing the 200 biggest companies have
a positive contribution in trade balance since 1994 whereas the rest of  the economy is
responsible for its deficit. The author concludes: «When the crisis of  the convertibility
regime began in 1998, the capital of  this component of  dominant sectors was concentrated
on dollarized financial assets, invested abroad and the revenues from the firms they control
in the country were equally dollarized» (p. 344-345).
Expected profit from buying privatized enterprises has justified private external
indebtedness because the perspective of  public external indebtedness was, from the start,
a pillar of  methodical confidence. After 1995, public debt is the spring of  hierarchical
confidence: it ensures the distributive compromise permanence, even if  the business com-
munity of  the capital components splits between a bet on a full dollarization and a bet on
a future devaluation.
The accumulation of  the pessimism of  anticipations since the first quarter of  2001
does not reveal any inconsistency in previous optimistic anticipations but rather that of
the coordination by the market theoretical model, of  which they were the expression. The
postulate that market liberalization and financial development would ensure the increase
of  the growth potential induced at once the emergence of  the systemic risks and the
inability to detect it. The success of  the convertibility Plan and the disaster it caused
went hand in hand.
This inter-temporal incoherence of  the monnayage rule had allowed the recasting
of  the symbolical, political, and economical society’s reproduction mechanisms. In political
action, the neo-liberal mutation of  Peronism makes the naturalization of  social relationships
concrete. Their legitimacy is the condition of  the incorporation of  the system of  account.
This legitimacy thus hangs on the perpetuation of  the nominal anchorage of  incomes’
promises. Their revaluation which leads to the crisis of  payments does not only challenge
an exchange regime but collective recognition of  the unit of  account. As this is the
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condition of  the economy liquidity, total wealth and short term incomes are devaluated,
with the exception of  the export‘s sector.
It results from this a simultaneous collapse of  ethical and hierarchical confidence
which entails the government fall in social explosion where meets the anger of  the poor
and the revolt against bank withdrawal limit. The term «corralito» is eloquent: to do not
dispose of  its money amounts bank clients to be a cattle paddock. A crisis of  external
funding, while becoming a systemic bank crisis, triggered a whole society reproduction
crisis because of  the illusion of  eternally «healthy» money that prevailed in the whole
social body
(17)
, with the exception of  a component of  capital.
Table 1: The sources of  confidence in a peso equal to the dollar, and of  its crisis
(18)
(17) The illusion’s real effects spread to most disfavored groups, as shows the part that the convertibility law has been able
to play in the representation of  national membership of  barrios’ inhabitants. The word is not just a neutral administrative
reference but recovers, in the common sense, a connotation of  social exclusion. The discourse analysis on economical
life of  the barrio shows that its inhabitants perceive “convertibility” (the word belongs to common language) as a
guarantee of  personal credits expansion and other informal gains by which they have access to money coming from
outside (Jacopin et Puex, 2002)
(18) We report in bold the basic functional form of  each state of  existence of  money.
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2.2. THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS: AN UNRESOLVED POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISTRIBUTIVE
CONFLICT
The exit of  the crisis required a recasting of  the system of  payments; this was
realized by the unilateral suspension of  public debt service, asymmetrical pesification and
the lowering of  real salaries to the level to which recession and inflation made them
plunge (figure 1). The sovereign reformulation of  the sole debt contracts and not of
labor ones defines the “flexible and cautious” monetary policy. The potential distributive
effects of  prior redefinition of  the nominal value of  monetary assets have determined
its efficiency but they raised an ethical question which lay at the heart of  the political
debate generated by the very problematic election of  a new president
(19)
.
The refusal to negotiate the restructuring of  debt with the IMF and, more broadly, the
whole economic policy choices, was not only a question of  monetary caution, as conceived
in a pure economical sense. The conviction strength of  the flexible economic policy model
was to respond to the legitimacy constraint and, very particularly, to its ethical dimension.
In this case, as well, the distance from the model to reality proves to be decisive.
The model re-establishes promises of  incomes in the short and medium term: it
draws a growth perspective based on the rise in profits and reduced unemployment. The
discourse of  a break with the former regime justifies a monetary reform implying the breach
of  contracts. The former makes the distributive compromise possible, reviving and
maximizing growth thanks to the redefinition of  relative prices. As a result, the possibility
of  public spending is revived, enabling the funding of  a massive assistance plan for the
poor and the repurchase of  provincial moneys — two objectives which, through their stakes in
provincial politics, conditioned the nation reunification as monetary territory (Théret and
Zanabria, 2007).
(19) After President Fernando de la Rùa resignation on 21.12.2001, three temporary Presidents followed one another in
less than two weeks, at the same time because of  the crisis of  political representation where acts the relationships
between local powers and internal divisions to parties but also because of  the absence of  any consensus on the strate-
gy to adopt. The fourth President elected by parliament, Eduardo Duhalde, the main Peronist opponent to Carlos
Menem, and chief  of  Buenos Aires suburbs’ political clientele, establishes the economic policy followed by the Presi-
dent elected with universal suffrage in 2003, Nestor Kirchner, and the new one, his wife Cristina Kirchner, elected in
2007. These elections confirm in polls the hegemony hijacking that obtained those who beard the ethical denunciation
of  the former regime into the Peronist party.
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The distance between the model theory and practice puts into perspective the aim
of  public debt clearing that would ensure long term growth. The constrained discretion
norm is lacking on the transparency of  official statistics on inflation and on public debt.
The indicators hide the possibility of  a risk of  system. The restoration of  ethical confidence
is sullied by the same limits than the former model to establish a distributive compromise
that does not reproduce the cycle of  public debt crisis.
2.2.1. A DISTRIBUTIVE COMPROMISE SHAPED ON THE GROUND OF ETHIC AND VALIDATED
BY MACRO-ECONOMY
The aim of  maximizing job creation is the nodal point of  the interdependence between
the functional forms of  money.
Coordination follows the constrained discretion norm. This justifies itself  in the
neo-structuralism approach by new structural characteristics of  the economy. Following
its opening, employment depends on the maintenance of  a competitive exchange rate and
on public debt-clearing (Frenkel, 2005). This macroeconomic policy of  employment gives
way to a discussion of  possibilities to recast citizenship in “globalized” economies by




The essential part of  inflation in the (very relative) conciliation of  interests ex-
presses itself  in a permanence of  distributive conflict weakening ethical and hierarchical
confidences. The distributive conflict is only softened by employment progress. After four
years of  high growth, real salary only reaches its previous lowest level since 1960, the
one to which it had plunged in the 1989 hyperinflation. On the other hand, from 2004, the
profit rate exceeds its highest level since 1960, reached in 1996, and continues then its
ascent. In the 1991/1994 growth phase, the salary rate had barely set up to the level of
1982 and 1989 previous floors (figure 2), resulting, among other factors, from inflation peaks.
The curve of  sharing of  revenues between the occupied population income and gross




The well more pronounced rise of  the profit rate as compared to the salary rate in
the crisis’ way out explains the importance that still re-covers the empowerment of  the
poor thematic in distributive conflict management. The analyses quoted above of  clienteles
power in the policy of  assistance to the poor (Lo Vuolo, 2007; Svampa, 2007) demonstrate
its permanence but nothing proves its efficiency in generating a new consensus regarding
social justice.
(20) The analysis of  the place of  employment in government policy opposes however various macroeconomic approaches,
not to mention the one of  the IMF. On the basis of  the former structuralism model revision, it is showed that the
growth of  employment margins according to the exchange rate are reversible and that they would not indicate thus a
structural change of  the growth regime because of  the opening but only its conjuncture effects (Keifman, 2007).
Furthermore, the current macroeconomic policy is analyzed as a perpetuation of  the social regulation inherited from
the convertibility regime, what equally puts into perspective the hypothesis of  a structural change that would authorize
a full-employment policy viable in the long term (Lo Vuolo, 2007).
(21) One must recall that Argentina was until the end of  the 1970s a salary society comparable to some European countries.
It is without doubt the only case of  a division by two, since then, of  the share of  labor incomes.
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Figure 2 — Revenues functional distribution
Source: CIEPP (2009), data CEPED (2007), Llach et Sanchez (1984), CEPAL (1991) and Ferreres (2005)
(Profit share of  GDP includes autonomous agents).
The restoration of  ethical confidence has in any case been performed on numerous
registers. We will only mention here those more representative. Criticism of  the former
economic policy seems to have been the favored ground of  a new representation of  general
interest that the system of  account should convey. Pesification leads to conflicts between
the executive and the courts, devoted to the highest judicial level the monetary range/scope
of  a national restructuring. The judgments that decided in favor of  demands for more
advantageous conversion of  some assets were invalidated by the Supreme Court, after
several of  its members who had been compromised under the previous regime were replaced.
We cannot, however, conclude that the uniqueness of  the monetary fact is firmly
established in collective action. The conciliation of  economic interests through the system
of  relative prices raises the question of  the (either or not) sustainable character of  economic
regulation from the point of  view of  inflation and the management of  the public debt.
The restoration of  ethical confidence in money does not necessarily lead to a common
vision of  national development.
This limit did not come to bear in the crisis’ exit because the short and medium term
growth perspective allowed the re-establishment of  a money market and ensured nominal
anchorage, besides a fast reduction of  unemployment and the funding of  social spending.
From a chronological viewpoint, the crisis’ exit is sketched on the ground of  ethical
confidence, which re-establishes the interaction between the instituted and objectified
states of  money: the monnayage of  debts limits the effects of  the repeal of  the convertibility
law on banks and enterprises’ balance-sheets. This limit to balance sheets deterioration,
added to the limit on foreign competition set by devaluation and the fact that its inflationary
effects are passed onto prices and not on salaries generate the revival of  profits. These
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consolidate the private and public debt-clearing. Growth ensures nominal anchorage of
relative prices. The monetary cautious objective of  authorities in the distributive conflict
administration is going to quickly find its limits, which the revival of  inflation in 2007
points out. Caution appears, moreover, unconfirmed from a public debt management
viewpoint.
2.2.2. THE LIMITS OF CONFIDENCE AND THE RENEWAL/CONTINUATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
The macro-economic link between public debt administration and price controls
develops through three measures that demonstrate the difficulty of  establishing an effective
social pact: 1/ an administrative fixing of  public tariffs which entailed investment insufficiency in
the sector, particularly regarding energy and transport; 2/ the negotiation (revealing
itself  inefficient) of  numerous prices, particularly the ones regarding oligopolies sectors;
3/ the regulation of  prices of  exportable food goods through the fixation of  export quotas
for products which domestic consumption is raised in a question of  national sovereignty.
The margins of  the prices control regime are restrained on macroeconomic level
because inflation is the condition of  maintenance of  «desired» profit margins confronted
with wage pressure being fed by a head-on conflict in agricultural price regulation by the
export tax or quota. Now, fiscal revenues from exports become a macroeconomic deter-
minant of  inflation. The profit margins are a function of  inflation and of  the growth rate,
which is conditioned by a budget surplus that the maintenance of  exchange rate requires.
Ceteris paribus from an external viewpoint, macroeconomic equilibriums were not guaranteed
and the new situation brought by the global crisis threatens to worsen the budgetary
problem. This one will probably not be linked to the issuance of  public debt for sterilization
of  currencies repurchase, that has limited up to now the exchange rate appreciation, but
at budget cost related the postponement clauses of  its amortization and that can imply as
well indexation clauses or the debt ‘s component drawn in currencies.
Before addressing this point in more details, one must report that the difficulties of
price control lead to a challenge to the official index since 2007
(22)
, especially by numerous
statisticians, including the employees of  the institution (INDEC) responsible for its calculus.
The credibility of  the economic policy is thus called into question, not that much because
of  the absence of  a social pact, but because this absence is in fact the very condition of  a
distributive compromise by default which seems the only possible. It explains the accom-
modating feature of  issuance policy, to which the government is constrained.
Negative, or close to zero, real interest rates are not the way to a credit revival.
Choices in monetary policy are a validation of  margin behaviors. Indeed one has to note
that the recovery of  the economic level of  liquidity has permitted an increase in real
profit rate average index of  around 50% between 2001 and 2006 (figure 1), which offsets
devaluation while wages remain at their devaluated level. Through the new regulation of
the monnayage of  debts, that asymmetrical pesification and the exchange regime have
established, the system of  account uniqueness combines three implicit units of  account.
(22) The official rate fluctuates around 10% and others around 20% since 2007. The distributive stake of  the official rate is
particularly important in the negotiation of  the civil service salaries and of  many others social benefits, beyond the
service and the liquidation value of  numerous titles.
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The devaluated peso draws all prices but it enables relative prices that, at minimum, com-
pensate devaluation through mark-up and indexation in the respective calculus of  expect-
ed profits and financial promises.
The threat that a real inflation higher than the official index devalues public debt
was thwarted by its indexation. The starting justification to serve the debt according to
the economic growth rate was in fact the source of  an excellent return. One must note
that the profitability of  the financial system has rested even more on titles than in the
currency board regime (CIEPP, 2009). The analysis of  the stock and service accountability
of  public debt raises the question of  the sustainable character of  financial promises.
Simulation of  the implicit cost to stock/flow adjustments of  public debt
(Cf. Lo Vuolo and Seppi, 2008)
Accordingly to data published by the “Boletin Fiscal”, the net stock of  debt of  Central
Administration lowered from 140% to 55% of  GDP between its peak of  final 2002 and
the end of  2006. Some other official documents, less mediated, provide a less optimistic
vision. First, this drop does not take into account the debt in default towards creditors
that have not accepted the new treasury bonds (12% of  GDP in 2006). It includes, on
the other side, the credence on provinces corresponding to their default debt with the
central administration. The credence in question represented, at the end of  2006, 65%
of  central administration’s assets and 8.5% of  GDP. Second, the lowering of  the stock
hides other types of  future potential flows that fiscal experts commonly name “skeletons
in the closet”. The expression refers to liabilities non registered in state’s current
financial balance from the moment that their settlement is conditional (loan guarantees
of  public enterprises, for example). The transparency of  public accounts equally seems
arguable, on this ground, regarding the postponed liabilities of  bonds issued in exchange
of  the default debt or of  the new bonds. The ones and the others imply a potential
budget cost that can be, among other factors, accorded to an indexation to inflation or
to GDP or even to an exchange rate, if  they are drawn in a currency. The simulated
calculus of  these implicit costs, on the basis of  the Ministry of  economy’s data, indicates
an impact on the Budget financial performance that would have signified an increase in
the debt stock which represents, in average 3.96% of  annual GDP between 2002 and
2006 or, concerning accumulated payments, 20% of  GDP. This increase shares out
almost equally between the indexed to GDP coupons’ increase and the capitalized
interests + indexation to inflation.
The progression of  national saving has covered the one of  investment and negative
foreign saving. However, the decline in current net stock of  public debt that national
accounts displays does not allow to conclude, as the Ministry of  economy may has done
(Mecon, 2005), that Argentine State was engaged in a process of  debt-clearing that reduces
the future need for foreign funding.
The potential future cost of  public debt does not prove per se that a new systemic
crisis, linked to public debt, would be inevitable. The above simulation put nevertheless in
doubt that its possibility would be neutralized by the accumulation of  exchange reserves
and the flexibility of  economic policy. There is, in this sense, an ignorance of  the possibil-
ity of a risk of system.
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In sum, the hierarchical confidence may have been re-established and guaranteed until
2007 through methodical confidence because the monetary regime was able to administer
the economic climate maximizing a growth based on investment funding by growing profits.
Both forms of  confidence are vulnerable because ethical confidence remains characterized
by the absence of  a long term vision of  national development that weakens macroeconomic
equilibriums. This fragility expresses itself  particularly in the weakness of  financial inter-
mediation between households’ saving and investment, indicated by the insignificant rise
of  credits share in the financial system total asset
(23)
. In the absence of  a national development
vision, by which ethical confidence could spring hierarchical confidence, the former is
challenged since the official rate of  inflation (and thus the implicit exchange rate target)
is no longer credible.
The consistency between functional forms of  money is thus precarious. Since the
system of  payment restoration — made concrete through the private debt-clearing and
the reduction of  media ratios of  public debt to GDP and of  the service of  public debt to
GDP, methodical confidence is assured. The existing distributive compromise is not the
guarantee of  long term growth. This monetary regime validating margins’ behaviors
testifies to, along with the weakness of  credit to the economy, a lack of  ethical confidence.
The debt-clearing of  the state, a key variable of  the growth regime, is uncertain, and its
moral scope is to be caught out. Creditors of  public debt, guilty of  moral hazard have
finally seen their punishment at least alleviated by the reassurance of  their incomes’
promises through the indexation clauses of  new titles.
Table 2: The sources of  confidence in a money with
«competitive and foreseeable» exchange rate 2002-2007
(23) For more details on the analysis of  macroeconomic correlations of  investment, saving and repartition, see Lo Vuolo
and Marques Pereira, 2009.
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CONCLUSION
The conception of  money as a total social fact permits a positive explanation of  the
financial sudden reversals instead of  the pure normative one in its neoclassical interpretation.
The general lessons of  this crisis and its way out are than rather different.
1. Sudden reversals of  anticipation that triggered the crisis are the result of  illusory
promises of  revenues in the long term. In the 1990s, this illusion was not the product of
an individual «irrationality» or a non functional “reforms forum” but rather the result of  a
theory that based in the possibility to neutralize money but was not supported by big
national economic groups. In and since the end of  the crisis, anticipations seem limited to
short and medium term.
Since money matters in the neoclassical theory only in the short term as policy
objective — insure its neutrality, the risk of  system that public indebtedness bears cannot
be considered because the long term is a deduced normative vision of  growth based on
the quality of  institutions.
2. The Argentine contingency of  systemic risk, stressed above, stems from the
toughening of  a distributive conflict. It is expressed in the rejection of  the indexation of
salaries to productivity gains and a valuation of  capital implying public indebtedness. All
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this only makes it a particular example of  the symbolical performance of  neo-quantitative
theory of  money as an intellectual referent of  a collective cognition that makes money a
veil, not of  relative prices — they could not be set without it, but of  social relationships
that it enables to naturalize as expression of  individual choices.
One must note that the strong growth of  economic buoyancy and employment in
the short term has not been sufficient to re-establish the ability of  money to naturalize
social relationships. In this regard, the outcome of  the Argentine crisis already presents
the ethical ground of  the way out of  the financial crisis in which the world is plunged
today. The Argentine experience points out the limit to bank rescuing and pump-priming
that do not consider the financial indebtedness regime. Could it be that the long term
illusion that the quantitative theory of  money was able to maintain be restored, as it was
in Argentina, through an ethical debate linked to moral hazard and the empowerment of
the poor. If  such is the case, the history of  the risk of  system ignorance does not appear
to be over.
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